

# COVID-19 Community of Practice for Ontario Family Physicians

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
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UNIVERSITY OF  
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# **Routes of transmission**



# Controversy around airborne versus droplet transmission of respiratory viruses: implication for infection prevention

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*Eunice Y.C. Shiu, Nancy H.L. Leung, and Benjamin J. Cowling*

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## **Purpose of review**

Health agencies recommend transmission-based precautions, including contact, droplet and airborne precautions, to mitigate transmission of respiratory viruses in healthcare settings. There is particular controversy over the importance of aerosol transmission and whether airborne precautions should be recommended for some respiratory viruses. Here, we review the current recommendations of transmission-based precautions and the latest evidence on the aerosol transmission of respiratory viruses.

## **Recent findings**

Viral nucleic acids, and in some instances viable viruses, have been detected in aerosols in the air in healthcare settings for some respiratory viruses such as seasonal and avian influenza viruses, Middle East respiratory syndrome-coronavirus and respiratory syncytial virus. However, current evidences are yet to demonstrate that these viruses can effectively spread via airborne route between individuals, or whether preventive measures in airborne precautions would be effective.

## **Summary**

Studies that use transmission events as outcome to demonstrate human-to-human transmission over the aerosol route or quantitative measurement of infectious respiratory viruses in the air are needed to evaluate the infectiousness of respiratory viruses over the aerosol route. When a respiratory virus in concern only leads to disease with low severity, airborne precautions are not likely to be justified.


Direct contact




Indirect contact



Droplet



Aerosol



**Indirect contact**

CORRESPONDENCE

## Aerosol and Surface Stability of SARS-CoV-2 as Compared with SARS-CoV-1


**TO THE EDITOR:** A novel human coronavirus that is now named severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) (formerly called HCoV-19) emerged in Wuhan, China, in late 2019 and is now causing a pandemic.<sup>1</sup> We analyzed the aerosol and surface stability of SARS-CoV-2 and compared it with SARS-CoV-1, the most closely related human coronavirus.<sup>2</sup>

We evaluated the stability of SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1 in aerosols and on various surfaces and estimated their decay rates using a Bayesian regression model (see the Methods section in the Supplementary Appendix, available with the full text of this letter at NEJM.org). SARS-CoV-2 nCoV-WA1-2020 (MN985325.1) and SARS-CoV-1 Tor2 (AY274119.3) were the strains used. Aerosols (<5  $\mu\text{m}$ ) containing SARS-CoV-2 ( $10^{5.25}$  50% tissue-culture infectious dose [TCID<sub>50</sub>] per milliliter) or SARS-CoV-1 ( $10^{6.75-7.00}$  TCID<sub>50</sub> per milliliter) were generated with the use of a three-jet Collison nebulizer and fed into a Goldberg drum to create an aerosolized environment. The inocu-

$10^{0.6}$  TCID<sub>50</sub> per milliliter of medium after 72 hours on plastic and from  $10^{3.7}$  to  $10^{0.6}$  TCID<sub>50</sub> per milliliter after 48 hours on stainless steel). The stability kinetics of SARS-CoV-1 were similar (from  $10^{3.4}$  to  $10^{0.7}$  TCID<sub>50</sub> per milliliter after 72 hours on plastic and from  $10^{3.6}$  to  $10^{0.6}$  TCID<sub>50</sub> per milliliter after 48 hours on stainless steel). On copper, no viable SARS-CoV-2 was measured after 4 hours and no viable SARS-CoV-1 was measured after 8 hours. On cardboard, no viable SARS-CoV-2 was measured after 24 hours and no viable SARS-CoV-1 was measured after 8 hours (Fig. 1A).

Both viruses had an exponential decay in virus titer across all experimental conditions, as indicated by a linear decrease in the  $\log_{10}$  TCID<sub>50</sub> per liter of air or milliliter of medium over time (Fig. 1B). The half-lives of SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1 were similar in aerosols, with median estimates of approximately 1.1 to 1.2 hours and 95% credible intervals of 0.64 to 2.64 for SARS-CoV-2 and 0.78 to 2.43 for SARS-CoV-1 (Fig. 1C, and Table S1 in the Supplementary Ap-

# Plastic



● SARS-CoV-2


● SARS-CoV-1

**Hours**

*van Doremalen et al, N Engl J Med 2020*

| Type of virus                           | Duration of persistence (range) |
|---|---------------------------------|
| Adenovirus                              | 7 days – 3 months               |
| Astrovirus                              | 7 – 90 days                     |
| Coronavirus                             | 3 hours                         |
| SARS associated virus                   | 72 – 96 hours                   |
| Coxsackie virus                         | > 2 weeks                       |
| Cytomegalovirus                         | 8 hours                         |
| Echovirus                               | 7 days                          |
| HAV                                     | 2 hours – 60 days               |
| HBV                                     | > 1 week                        |
| HIV                                     | > 7 days                        |
| Herpes simplex virus, type 1 and 2      | 4.5 hours – 8 weeks             |
| Influenza virus                         | 1 – 2 days                      |
| Norovirus and feline calici virus (FCV) | 8 hours – 7 days                |
| Papillomavirus 16                       | > 7 days                        |
| Papovavirus                             | 8 days                          |
| Parvovirus                              | > 1 year                        |
| Poliovirus type 1                       | 4 hours – < 8 days              |
| Poliovirus type 2                       | 1 day – 8 weeks                 |
| Pseudorabies virus                      | ≥ 7 days                        |
| Respiratory syncytial virus             | up to 6 hours                   |
| Rhinovirus                              | 2 hours – 7 days                |
| Rotavirus                               | 6 – 60 days                     |
| Vacciniavirus                           | 3 weeks – > 20 weeks            |

Low frequency of contact (60-240 min)



# **Droplets & aerosols**

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Open Access

# Cough aerosol in healthy participants: fundamental knowledge to optimize droplet-spread infectious respiratory disease management

Gustavo Zayas<sup>1\*</sup>, Ming C Chiang<sup>1</sup>, Eric Wong<sup>2</sup>, Fred MacDonald<sup>3</sup>, Carlos F Lange<sup>4</sup>, Ambikaipakan Senthilselvan<sup>5</sup> and Malcolm King<sup>1</sup>


## Abstract

**Background:** The Influenza A H1N1 virus can be transmitted via direct, indirect, and airborne route to non-infected subjects when an infected patient coughs, which expels a number of different sized droplets to the surrounding environment as an aerosol. The objective of the current study was to characterize the human cough aerosol pattern with the aim of developing a standard human cough bioaerosol model for Influenza Pandemic control.

**Method:** 45 healthy non-smokers participated in the open bench study by giving their best effort cough. A laser diffraction system was used to obtain accurate, time-dependent, quantitative measurements of the size and number of droplets expelled by the cough aerosol.


**Results:** Voluntary coughs generated droplets ranging from 0.1 - 900 microns in size. Droplets of less than one-micron size represent 97% of the total number of measured droplets contained in the cough aerosol. Age, sex, weight, height and corporal mass have no statistically significant effect on the aerosol composition in terms of size

⊕ = Sensors



## Open Bench Cough

**Figure 1** Laser and sensor arrangement for Cough Aerosol detection.



**Figure 2 Full spectrum characterization of cough aerosol number versus droplets diameter per second.**



## CORRESPONDENCE

## Visualizing Speech-Generated Oral Fluid Droplets with Laser Light Scattering


**TO THE EDITOR:** Aerosols and droplets generated during speech have been implicated in the person-to-person transmission of viruses,<sup>1,2</sup> and there is current interest in understanding the mechanisms responsible for the spread of Covid-19 by these means. The act of speaking generates oral fluid droplets that vary widely in size,<sup>1</sup> and these droplets can harbor infectious virus particles. Whereas large droplets fall quickly to the ground, small droplets can dehydrate and linger as “droplet nuclei” in the air, where they behave like an aerosol and thereby expand the spatial extent of emitted infectious particles.<sup>2</sup> We report the results of a laser light-scattering experiment in which

speech-generated droplets and their trajectories were visualized.

The output from a 532-nm green laser operating at 2.5-W optical power was transformed into a light sheet that was approximately 1 mm thick and 150 mm tall. We directed this light sheet through slits on the sides of a cardboard box measuring 53 × 46 × 62 cm. The interior of the box was

**Figure 1. Emission of Droplets While a Person Said “Stay Healthy.”**

Droplets generated during speech produced flashes as they passed through the light sheet in this experiment. Panel A shows the flash count during each





Damp washcloth, detection of droplets of 20 to 500  $\mu\text{m}$  diameter

## JAMA Insights

# Turbulent Gas Clouds and Respiratory Pathogen Emissions

## Potential Implications for Reducing Transmission of COVID-19

Lydia Bourouiba, PhD

**The current coronavirus disease 2019** (COVID-19) outbreak vividly demonstrates the burden that respiratory infectious diseases impose in an intimately connected world. Unprecedented containment and mitigation policies have been implemented in an effort to limit the spread of COVID-19, including travel restrictions, screening and testing of travelers, isolation and quarantine, and school closures.

A key goal of such policies is to decrease the encounters between infected individuals and susceptible individuals and decelerate the rate of transmission. Although such social distancing strategies are critical in the current time of pandemic, it may seem




[Video](#)

surprising that the current understanding of the routes of host-to-host transmission in respiratory infectious diseases are predicated on a model of disease transmission developed in the 1930s that, by modern standards, seems overly simplified. Implementing public health recommendations based on these older models may limit the effectiveness of the proposed interventions.

### Understanding Respiratory Infectious Disease Transmission

In 1897, Carl Flügge showed that pathogens were present in expiratory droplets large enough to settle around an infected individual. "Droplet transmission" by contact with the ejected and infected fluid phase of droplets was thought to be the primary route for respiratory transmission of diseases. This view prevailed until William F. Wells focused


Figure. Multiphase Turbulent Gas Cloud From a Human Sneeze




ment policies were enforced, the rapid international spread of COVID-19 suggests that using arbitrary droplet size cutoffs may not accurately reflect what actually occurs with respiratory emissions, possibly contributing to the ineffectiveness of some procedures used to limit the spread of respiratory disease.

### New Model for Respiratory Emissions

Recent work has demonstrated that exhalations, sneezes, and



Close-up view of emission within 50 cm (20 in) from a healthy person during a violent exhalation (sneeze), originally recorded at 2000 frames per second; actual duration is 0.25 seconds




Approximately 7-8 m (23-26 ft)



Approximately 7-8 m (23-26 ft)



Approximately 7-8 m (23-26 ft)



≈ 7-8 m

*Bourouiba, JAMA 2020*



# Infectious virus in exhaled breath of symptomatic seasonal influenza cases from a college community

Jing Yan<sup>a,b</sup>, Michael Grantham<sup>a,1</sup>, Jovan Pantelic<sup>a,2</sup>, P. Jacob Bueno de Mesquita<sup>a</sup>, Barbara Albert<sup>a</sup>, Fengjie Liu<sup>a,3</sup>, Sheryl Ehrman<sup>b,4</sup>, Donald K. Milton<sup>a,5</sup>, and EMIT Consortium<sup>6</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Maryland Institute for Applied Environmental Health, School of Public Health, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742; and <sup>b</sup>Department of Chemical and Biomolecular Engineering, Clark School of Engineering, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742

Edited by Peter Palese, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, and approved December 15, 2017 (received for review September 19, 2017)

Little is known about the amount and infectiousness of influenza virus shed into exhaled breath. This contributes to uncertainty about the importance of airborne influenza transmission. We screened 355 symptomatic volunteers with acute respiratory illness and report 142 cases with confirmed influenza infection who provided 218 paired nasopharyngeal (NP) and 30-minute breath samples (coarse  $>5\text{-}\mu\text{m}$  and fine  $\leq 5\text{-}\mu\text{m}$  fractions) on days 1–3 after symptom onset. We assessed viral RNA copy number for all samples and cultured NP swabs and fine aerosols. We recovered infectious virus from 52 (39%) of the fine aerosols and 150 (89%) of the NP swabs with valid cultures. The geometric mean RNA copy numbers were  $3.8 \times 10^4/30\text{-minutes}$  fine-,  $1.2 \times 10^4/30\text{-minutes}$  coarse-aerosol sample, and  $8.2 \times 10^8$  per NP swab. Fine- and coarse-aerosol viral RNA were positively associated with body mass index and number of coughs and negatively associated with increasing days since symptom onset in adjusted models. Fine-aerosol viral RNA was also positively associated with having influenza vaccination for both the current and prior season. NP swab viral RNA was positively associated with upper respiratory symptoms and negatively associated with age but was not significantly associated with fine- or coarse-aerosol viral RNA or their predictors. Sneezing was rare, and sneezing and coughing were not necessary for infectious aerosol generation. Our observations suggest that influenza infection in the upper and lower airways are compartmentalized and


gaps by characterizing influenza virus in exhaled breath from community-acquired influenza cases during natural breathing, prompted speech, coughing, and sneezing, and assess the infectivity of naturally occurring influenza aerosols.

## Results


We screened 355 volunteers with acute respiratory illness; the 178 volunteers who met enrollment criteria provided 278 visits for sample collection. We confirmed influenza infection in 156 (88%) of the enrolled participants using qRT-PCR; 152 had at least one positive nasopharyngeal (NP) swab and 4 (3%) were confirmed based on positive aerosol samples alone. NP swab analysis was positive for 8 (33%) of 24 randomly selected volunteers from among the 177 screened who did not meet enrollment criteria; thus, sensitivity and specificity of our enrollment criteria, during the 2012–2013 season, were  $\sim 73\%$  [95% confidence interval (CI) 62–84%] and 84% (95% CI 80–88%), respectively. In the reported analyses, we excluded 8 visits made on the day of symptom onset, 10 made  $>3$  d after onset, 7 with missing data for cough, and 3 with

## Significance

Lack of human data on influenza virus aerosol shedding fuels debate over the importance of airborne transmission. We



# Aerosols



# Professional and Home-Made Face Masks Reduce Exposure to Respiratory Infections among the General Population

Marianne van der Sande<sup>1\*</sup>, Peter Teunis<sup>1,2</sup>, Rob Sabel<sup>3</sup>

**1** National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, Netherlands, **2** Hubert Department of Global Health, Rollins School of Public Health, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America, **3** Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), Rijswijk, Netherlands

## Abstract

**Background:** Governments are preparing for a potential influenza pandemic. Therefore they need data to assess the possible impact of interventions. Face-masks worn by the general population could be an accessible and affordable intervention, if effective when worn under routine circumstances.

**Methodology:** We assessed transmission reduction potential provided by personal respirators, surgical masks and home-made masks when worn during a variety of activities by healthy volunteers and a simulated patient.

**Principal Findings:** All types of masks reduced aerosol exposure, relatively stable over time, unaffected by duration of wear or type of activity, but with a high degree of individual variation. Personal respirators were more efficient than surgical masks, which were more efficient than home-made masks. Regardless of mask type, children were less well protected. Outward protection (mask wearing by a mechanical head) was less effective than inward protection (mask wearing by healthy volunteers).

**Conclusions/Significance:** Any type of general mask use is likely to decrease viral exposure and infection risk on a population level, in spite of imperfect fit and imperfect adherence, personal respirators providing most protection. Masks worn by patients may not offer as great a degree of protection against aerosol transmission.

**Citation:** van der Sande M, Teunis P, Sabel R (2008) Professional and Home-Made Face Masks Reduce Exposure to Respiratory Infections among the General Population. PLoS ONE 3(7): e2618. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002618

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**Table 1.** Median (IQR) protection factor by mask, by activity, by age category.

|               |          | <b>no activity</b> | <b>nodding</b> | <b>shaking</b> | <b>reading</b> | <b>walking</b> |
|---------------|----------|--------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Tea cloth     | Adults   | 2.5 (2.1–2.9)      | 2.2 (1.9–2.5)  | 2.2 (1.9–2.7)  | 3.2 (2.5–3.9)  | 2.4 (2.1–3.3)  |
|               | children | 2.2 (1.5–2.2)      | 1.9 (1.5–2.3)  | 1.9 (1.4–2.3)  | 2.2 (1.8–3.7)  | 2.2 (1.8–2.4)  |
| Surgical mask | Adults   | 4.1 (3.1–7.2)      | 4.7 (3.4–7.3)  | 5.1 (3.2–7.6)  | 5.3 (4.3–8.0)  | 4.2 (3.1–5.7)  |
|               | children | 3.2 (2.2–4.1)      | 3.4 (2.7–5.2)  | 3.6 (2.7–4.3)  | 4.9 (4.0–5.3)  | 3.6 (2.4–4.2)  |
| FFP2 mask     | Adults   | 113 (26–210)       | 82 (45–179)    | 91 (23–187)    | 66 (29–107)    | 99 (19–169)    |
|               | children | 18 (6.1–165)       | 13 (3.8–41)    | 18 (4.0–54)    | 35 (8.6–91)    | 15 (5.1–176)   |

IQR = interquartile range

# Evaluation of Cloth Masks and Modified Procedure Masks as Personal Protective Equipment for the Public During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Phillip W. Clapp, PhD; Emily E. Sickbert-Bennett, PhD, MS; James M. Samet, PhD, MPH; Jon Berntsen, PhD; Kirby L. Zeman, PhD; Deverick J. Anderson, MD, MPH; David J. Weber, MD, MPH; William D. Bennett, PhD; for the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Epicenters Program

[← Editor's Note page 470](#)

**IMPORTANCE** During the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the general public has been advised to wear masks or improvised face coverings to limit transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). However, there has been considerable confusion and disagreement regarding the degree to which masks protect the wearer from airborne particles.

**OBJECTIVES** To evaluate the fitted filtration efficiency (FFE) of various consumer-grade and improvised face masks, as well as several popular modifications of medical procedure masks that are intended to improve mask fit or comfort.

**DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS** For this study conducted in a research laboratory between June and August 2020, 7 consumer-grade masks and 5 medical procedure mask modifications were fitted on an adult male volunteer, and FFE measurements were collected during a series of repeated movements of the torso, head, and facial muscles as outlined by the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration Quantitative Fit Testing Protocol. The consumer-grade masks tested included (1) a 2-layer nylon mask with ear loops that was tested with an optional aluminum nose bridge and filter insert in place, (2) a cotton bandana folded diagonally once (ie, "bandit" style) or in a (3) multilayer rectangle according to the instructions presented by the US Surgeon General, (4) a single-layer polyester/nylon mask with ties, (5) a polypropylene mask with fixed ear loops, (6) a single-layer polyester

Figure 1. Consumer-Grade Masks and Improvised Face Coverings

A 2-Layer nylon mask




B Cotton bandana




C Cotton bandana folded in a rectangle



D Single-layer polyester/nylon mask



E Nonwoven polypropylene mask



F Single-layer gaiter/neck cover balaclava bandana



G 3-Layer cotton mask



Figure 2. Medical Procedure Mask and Modifications Designed to Enhance Mask Fit or Comfort for the Wearer

A Medical procedure mask



B Tied ear loops and tucked in side pleats



C 3-D-printed ear guard



D Claw-type hair clip



E Three ganged rubber bands



F Segment of nylon hosiery



**Table. Face Mask FFE Against Submicron Particle Penetration**

| Consumer-grade face masks                                    | Condition     | % FFE (SD) <sup>a</sup> |
|--|---------------|-------------------------|
| 2-Layer nylon mask with ear loops                            |               |                         |
| Without aluminum nose bridge                                 | New           | 44.7 (6.4)              |
| With aluminum nose bridge                                    | New           | 56.3 (6.5)              |
| With aluminum nose bridge and 1 insert                       | New           | 74.4 (4.8)              |
| With aluminum nose bridge, washed (no insert)                | Washed 1 time | 79.0 (4.3)              |
| Cotton bandana   |               |                         |
| Folded surgeon general style                                 | New           | 49.9 (5.8)              |
| Folded "bandit" style  | New           | 49.0 (6.2)              |
| Single-layer polyester gaiter/neck cover (balaclava bandana) | New           | 37.8 (5.2)              |
| Single-layer polyester/nylon mask with ties                  | New           | 39.3 (7.2)              |
| Polypropylene mask with fixed ear loops                      | New           | 28.6 (13.9)             |
| 3-Layer cotton mask with ear loops                           | New           | 26.5 (10.5)             |
| Medical face masks and modifications                         |               |                         |
| 3M 9210 NIOSH-approved N95 respirator                        | New           | 98.4 (0.5)              |
| Surgical mask with ties                                      | New           | 71.5 (5.5)              |
| Procedure mask with ear loops                                | New           | 38.5 (11.2)             |
| Procedure mask with ear loops                                |               |                         |
| Loops tied and corners tucked in                             | New           | 60.3 (11.1)             |
| Ear guard  | New           | 61.7 (6.5)              |
| 23-mm Claw hair clip   | New           | 64.8 (5.1)              |
| Fix-the-mask (3 rubber bands)                                | New           | 78.2 (3.3)              |
| Nylon hosiery sleeve   | New           | 80.2 (3.1)              |

# Letters

## RESEARCH LETTER

### Fitted Filtration Efficiency of Double Masking During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Although global vaccination efforts against SARS-CoV-2 are underway, the public is urged to continue using face masks as a primary intervention to control transmission.<sup>1</sup> Recently, US public health officials have also encouraged doubling masks as a strategy to counter elevated transmission associated with infectious SARS-CoV-2 variants.<sup>2</sup> US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention investigators reported that doubling masks increased effectiveness, but their assessment was limited in type and combinations of masks tested, as well as by the use of head forms rather than humans. To address these limitations, this study compared the fitted filtration efficiency (FFE)<sup>3,4</sup> of commonly available masks worn singly, doubled, or in combinations.

**Methods** | Face-covering FFE was measured on 1 female volunteer (weight, 53 kg; height, 160 cm; head circumference, 56.0 cm) and 2 male volunteers with shaven faces (weight, 75 kg; height, 178 cm; head circumference, 58.5 cm; and weight, 76 kg; height, 175 cm; head circumference, 55.9 cm, respectively), as described previously.<sup>3,4</sup> In brief, FFE corresponds to the concentration of particles behind the mask expressed as a percentage of the particle concentration in a sodium chloride particle-enriched chamber atmosphere [FFE% = 100 × (1 – behind the mask particle concentration/

tures were 22 °C to 24 °C, and relative humidities were 42% to 52%. For the doubling of each procedure and cloth mask tested, the same mask worn singly served as a control. For all cloth-procedure mask combinations, the same procedure mask (Intco) was used for all, with the single cloth mask serving as the control. The institutional review board at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill waived the need for study approval as well as individual consent needed for device testing.

**Results** | As shown in the **Table**, procedure masks worn singly by study volunteers showed a range of mean (SD) FFE between 43% (2%) and 62% (11%). On average, across all masks and volunteers, adding a second procedure mask improved mean (SD) FFE from 55% (11%) when single masking to 66% (12%) when double masking. Single cloth masks performed less efficiently (mean [SD] FFE range, 41% [12%] to 44% [12%]) than the procedure masks. Doubling a cotton mask improved FFE but could reduce breathability.


Although adding a procedure mask (mean [SD] FFE, 61% [13%]) over the cloth masks provided modest increases in their FFE (mean [SD] range, 55% [10%] to 60% [14%]), the overall performance was no different than wearing the procedure mask by itself. In contrast, wearing a procedure mask under the cloth face covering produced marked improvements in overall FFE (mean [SD] range, 66% [5%] to 81% [6%]).

**Discussion** | Disposable medical procedure masks are commonly worn in health care and public settings during the


**Table. Fitted Filtration Efficiency (FFE) of Face Masks Tested in 1 Female and 2 Male Volunteers<sup>a</sup>**

| Face mask                  | FFE, mean (SD), % |             |            |
|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------|------------|
|                            | Single mask       | Double mask | Difference |
| Procedure ear-loop masks   |                   |             |            |
| Medline                    | 53 (8)            | 68 (16)     | 14 (15)    |
| Henry                      | 62 (11)           | 74 (4)      | 12 (7)     |
| Shine Ya                   | 43 (2)            | 55 (10)     | 12 (8)     |
| Intco                      | 61 (13)           | 66 (9)      | 4 (12)     |
| Cloth masks                |                   |             |            |
| Hanes cotton ear-loop mask | 44 (12)           | 57 (14)     | 14 (4)     |
| Procedure mask worn over   | NA                | 59 (18)     | 16 (10)    |
| Procedure mask worn under  | NA                | 66 (5)      | 23 (12)    |
| Cotton bandana             | 44 (4)            | NA          | NA         |
| Procedure mask worn over   | NA                | 55 (10)     | 11 (8)     |
| Procedure mask worn under  | NA                | 77 (10)     | 33 (10)    |
| Polyester gaiter           | 41 (12)           | NA          | NA         |
| Procedure mask worn over   | NA                | 60 (14)     | 19 (7)     |
| Procedure mask worn under  | NA                | 81 (6)      | 40 (6)     |

**protecting yourself**  
(inward protection)



**protecting others**  
(outward protection)



| particles leaked through mask | particles produced in environment |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| TEA CLOTH (home made)         | 100<br>(reference value)          |
| SURGICAL MASK                 |                                   |
| FFP2 (=N95 equivalent)        |                                   |

| particles produced by coughing | particles leaked into environment |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 100<br>(reference value)       | TEA CLOTH (home made)             |
|                                | SURGICAL MASK                     |
|                                | FFP2 (=N95 equivalent)            |

TEA CLOTH (home made)  
SURGICAL MASK  
FFP2 (=N95 equivalent)

## 10 Reasons in Support of Role of Aerosols in Transmission

1

### **Superspreading events with long-range SARS-CoV-2 transmission**

Superspreading events on cruise ships, concert choirs, correctional facilities etc. where individuals are often spread far apart, in a contained environment suggest airborne transmission

2

### **SARS-CoV-2 transmission between adjacent rooms**

Outbreaks in apartment buildings and hotels between individuals who have not come in contact with one another, but have shared a ventilation system suggest airborne transmission

3

### **Asymptomatic and presymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 transmission**

Absence of coughing and sneezing in asymptomatic and presymptomatic transmission suggests potential airborne transmission

4

### **Higher levels of transmission indoors, as compared to outdoors**

The overwhelming majority of SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks happened indoors

5

### **Nosocomial infections in the presence of PPEs that protect against droplet transmission**

6

### **Detection of infectious SARS-CoV-2 in the air for up to 3 hours**

7

### **Presence of SARS-CoV-2 in air filters and air ducts in hospitals with COVID-19 patients**

SARS-CoV-2 in these locations could have only occurred via airborne transmission

8

### **Experimental evidence**

Studies involving infected caged animals that were connected to separately caged uninfected animals via an air duct have shown transmission of SARS-CoV-2 that can be adequately explained only by aerosols

9

### **No strong or consistent evidence against airborne transmission**


No study has provided strong or consistent evidence to refute the hypothesis of airborne SARS-CoV-2 transmission

10


### **Limited evidence for other dominant routes of transmission**

Ease of infection between people in close proximity can be due to either airborne transmission or due to respiratory droplet transmission of SARS-CoV-2.


**Delta (B1.617.2)**




# Inflection point: 50% of N501Y-likely are Delta-variants



N501Y+ variants



N501Y- variants



# Increased transmissibility

|                   | <b><math>R_0</math></b> | <b>Increase</b> |
|-------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|
| Wild type (Wuhan) | 2.2                     | -               |
| B.1.1.7 (UK)      | 3.3                     | x 1.5           |
| B.1.617 (India)   | 5.0                     | x 1.5           |

# Vaccine Effectiveness larger after 2<sup>nd</sup> dose for Delta, larger after 1<sup>st</sup> dose for Alpha

|   | VE         | RR        |
|---|------------|-----------|
| Alpha (B1.1.7.)                             |            |           |
| 1 <sup>st</sup> dose                        | 70%        | 0.30      |
| 1 <sup>st</sup> & 2 <sup>nd</sup> dose      | 90%        | 0.10      |
| Added effectiveness of 2 <sup>nd</sup> dose | <b>33%</b> | 0.10/0.30 |
| Delta (B1.617.2)                            |            |           |
| 1 <sup>st</sup> dose                        | 40%        | 0.60      |
| 1 <sup>st</sup> & 2 <sup>nd</sup> dose      | 90%        | 0.10      |
| Added effectiveness of 2 <sup>nd</sup> dose | <b>83%</b> | 0.10/0.60 |

# Conclusions

- 4 plausible routes of transmission
  - Individual contribution depends on the setting and is difficult to quantify
- Aerosol transmission is a relevant route
  - Safety measures in the community include being outdoors, good ventilation, low occupancy, 2 meters distance, well-fitting masks of high quality
- Indirect contact may be a relevant route in high prevalence settings
  - Hand hygiene, but not necessarily surface disinfection useful in the presence of reasonable cleaning protocols
- Delta will become dominant in Ontario
  - We can 'vaccinate ourselves out of a fourth wave'
  - Unvaccinated people have a high probability to get infected in the future